The Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice has strong connections to academic research on matching algorithms, school admissions and the effectiveness of education reforms. IIPSC’s principals have been leaders in producing peer-reviewed research on education reform and school choice. A central IIPSC goal is to use data generated by choice systems to improve the design of school choice systems and to study their effects.
Some representative publications include:
“Charters Without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston.” NBER Working Paper, 20792.
“Explaining Charter School Effectiveness.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(4): 1-27, 2013.
“The Elite Illusion: Achievement Effects in Boston and New York Exam Schools.” Econometrica, 82(1): 137-196.
“Small High Schools and Student Achievement: Lottery-Based Evidence from New York City.” NBER Working Paper, 19576.
“Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston’s Charters and Pilots.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(2): 699-748, 2011.
“Strategy-proofness vs. Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match.” American Economic Review, 99(5): 1954-1978, 2009.
If you are looking for the latest articles on theory and practice in school choice mechanism design, please visit the individual websites of our team members.
Alvin Roth’s Market Design Blog